Due to meteorological factors, the distribution of the environmental damage due to climate change bears no relationship to that of global emissions. We argue in favor of o¤setting this discrepancy, and propose a "global insurance scheme"to be …ncanced according to countries'responsibility for climate change. Because GHG decay very slowly, we argue that the actual burden of global warming should be shared on the basis of cumulated emissions, raher than sharing the expected costs of actual emissions as in a Pigovian taxation scheme. We characterize new versions of two well-known cost-sharing schemes by adapting the responsibility theory of Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) to a context with externalities.
Introduction
Nowadays, climate change is a notion pervading our collective human psyche, from policy design to everyday conversations, usually under the more casual designation of "global warming". Accompanying our awareness of climatic change is the growing realization that the impacts of global warming are not uniformly distributed across the globe. Yet, by itself, the fact that countries are unequally a¤ected by climate change does not warrant a cry against injustice. Indeed, if the regions most a¤ected by climate change were also the ones contributing to it the most, the observation would be less shocking. However, when comparing maps of recent and cumulated emissions with that of temperature anomalies, one cannot help but notice that they do not coincide ( Figure 1 ). Add to it the fact that the melting of icecaps resulting from climate change will disproportionately impact coastal cities, and it becomes clear that some countries end up generating more harm than they endure, while others must absorb more damage than they cause. In other words, under the near-consensual assumption that the increase in human activity has contributed to climate change, climate change is a prime example of a global externality. Yet, because the discrepancy between the distribution of GHG emissions in the atmosphere, and their resulting impacts, is due to "natural" phenomena (e.g., winds, currents, the melting of icecaps, etc.), and because it is impossible to trace back to its origin the damage borne by any given region, we argue that the distribution of damages lies beyond the responsibility of any country.
Nonetheless, provided the aggregate environmental impact of climate change as well as emissions patterns of each country are observable, one can hope to solve this global cost-sharing problem of sorts.
We argue in favor of a global insurance scheme that washes out di¤erences in the distributions of damages, for which countries are not responsible. Similarly, the …nancing of this scheme should holds countries responsible for the (global) 3 damage for which they are indeed responsible.
A standard approach to implementing the …rst-best level of pollution is through Pigou taxes (or equivalent schemes), which succeed by making polluters internalize the social marginal cost of their externality (pigou, 1932; Baumol, 1972; Nordhaus, 1992) . While the "polluter pays" principle behind this approach is very appealing, Pigou taxation can only perform satisfactorily when the social marginal cost can be reasonably well approximated. However, given that the lifetime of GHG emissions may last more than hundreds or even thousands of years (see Archer, 2005 , and Archer and Brovkin, 2008), Pigou taxation is based on expected costs of uncertain events far o¤ in the future, which are very di¢ cult to estimate in practice (Stern 2008 ). In addition, Pigou taxation is silent on the question of discounting these future costs over hundreds of years and on the normative question of intergenerational equity. Lastly, even if the …rst-best level of emissions is reached, some climate change will occur (as a result of past and current emissions), because some pollution is e¢ cient.
Pigou taxation does not explicitly handle the normative question of horizontal (or intra-generational) equity raised by the imbalance between the distribution of emissions and the distribution of damages.
We propose an alternative approach to Pigou taxation which overcomes the shortcomings identi…ed above while remaining entirely compatible with the Pigovian outcome (i.e., a …rst-best pollution level). The key feature of our approach is that it does not rely on estimates of future costs, but rebalances the distribution of current (known) damages each period, thus also circumventing the issue of discounting. Within each period, we treat the issue as a traditional cost-sharing problem, where damages depend on countries' past and current emissions. We address the issue of global equity by expliciting the responsibility of countries to the global damage according to their past and current emissions 4 as well as other characteristics (GDP, geographical location, population, etc.).
We are fully aware that the debate on countries'responsibilities for past emissions is still raging, and it is a debate which is beyond the scope of this work.
Nonetheless, our approach is ‡exible enough to accomodate the most prominent competing ideologies, precisely because we let the planner decide explicitly the characteristics for which countries are to be held responsible.
More precisely, the responsibility/compensation approach we adopt is related to that in Bossert & Fleurbaey (1996) in that the planner's …rst decision is to identify for which characteristics countries should be held responsible and for which characteristics they should be held "non responsible"-and thus compensated. For instance, in our context, the planner may deem that current populations are responsible for their current GHG emissions and must therefore pay for all the resulting damages, but that they are not responsible for their geographical location and corresponding climate, and that their cost share should not depend on their geographical location, all else equal (emissions, in particular). Yet, a tension already arises from this seemingly innocent decision. For example, according to the planner, a country which experiences cold winters, like Canada, should be held responsible for its emissions but at the same time should be compensated for the fact that its emissions are high due to heating needs. In fact, it has been established (Bossert, 1995) that holding economic agents fully responsible for some characteristics was incompatible with full compensation along the other characteristics unless the cost function is separable along the responsibility/compensation dimensions. Because one cannot reasonably assume such separability, the two taxation schemes that will stand out from our analysis (the Egalitarian Equivalent and the Conditionally Equivalent mechanisms) result from compromises between full compensation and full responsibility.
From a policy standpoint, our …ndings show that environmental taxation à la Pigou, which is often considered the epitome of responsibilization, popularized by its implementation of the …rst-best pollution levels, is compatible with a modicum of compensation for di¤erences in irrelevant characteristics.
In particular, the Conditionally Equivalent solution can be viewed as a Pigou tax followed by redistributive transfers. To the best of our knowledge, it provides the …rst axiomatic speci…cation of how to allocate the Pigou tax revenues, both to wash out the damages su¤ered by each country, and for cross-country compensation.
A reverse approach to taxation
The leveling of environmental damage presented above requires possibly large funds, equal to the sum of all climate-change-related damage across the globe.
Indeed, if we denote by d it the environmental damage su¤ered by country i due to climate change over a given period, t, the total amount of funds necessary to cancel out the damage for all countries in that period adds up to D t P i;t d it . 1 Obviously, given the global nature of the issue, the …nancing of the levelling compensation must be collectively borne by the very same countries which are receiving these compensations. Hence, the leveling compensation is, in essence, a redistribution mechanism designed to counter the arbitrary nature of the distribution of climate-change damage across the globe.
Two arguments are in order. First, given that we consider climate change to be closely related to GHG emissions, we argue that the damage-o¤setting scheme should be …nanced in relation to the countries'emission levels, via a tax on emissions of sorts. 2 Ideally, this tax should be set so as to achieve e¢ cient 1 The dynamic nature of the problem and the relation between damage and carbon emissions will be made explicit below, as needed in the argumentation. 2 Naturally, this point becomes moot if the planner believes climate change to be completely 6 emission levels. However, we take the view that emissions are like environmental debt issued by polluters at all times s < t, a portion of which will be collected over time in the form of the environmental damage D t . Therefore, unlike the common Pigovian view that the emissions tax should be set equal to the discounted expected future social marginal damage (Nordhaus, 1992) , the mechanism we propose repays the "debt", D t , of observed environmental damage each period. Thus, our approach avoids the problematic issue of accurately evaluating expected future costs of uncertain future events, which proves extremely di¢ cult in practice (see, e.g., Stern's AEA presidential address 2008).
This task is all the more di¢ cult as carbon emissions may persist in the atmosphere for up to thousands of years, thus making unrealistic the estimation of future damage so far in the future. Instead, by basing the emissions tax on current observed environmental damage, our mechanism circumvents this di¢ cult estimation issue entirely 3 .
An additional bene…t of our "reverse" approach compared to the forwardlooking one is that it circumvents another very problematic issue related to the large lifetime of CO 2 emissions: intergenerational discounting. Indeed, discounting beyond several decades already poses the delicate question of how to consider future costs or bene…ts. In other words, it is not just the discount rate itself which is contentious, but the very nature of the discounting (e.g., exponential versus hyperbolic, see Henderson and Bateman, 1995) . With the timespans involved by CO 2 emissions covering possibly hundreds or even thousands of years, it seems foolish to envision being able to reach any non-controversial present values of environmental damage. By contrast, our "reverse" approach bypasses the issue entirely due to the fact that period-per-period optimizing countries will unrelated to human activity. In that case, the rest of our analysis can be interpreted as tackling the issue of the arbitrariness of climate change-which is considered to be happening, regardless of the causes. 3 Evaluating current damages remains a di¢ cult task, but a considerably less daunting one than predicting damage occurring in the distant future. 7 behave as if they had anticipated expected future damage. Indeed, we show by a simple dynamic programming argument in a companion paper (Billette de Vllemeur and Leroux, 2010 ) that the usual, forward-looking Pigovian tax, under rational expectations, coïncides with our "reverse" scheme. The intuition is that each country would correctly anticipate the impact of its current emissions on future damages and respond according to its own discount rate.
Compensation and responsibility
We now address the question of who will pay how much. Given our responsibilitybased approach to fairness, this …nal discussion amounts to sorting out the responsibility of each country in the matter. We adopt the following general principle: "Countries should pay for damage caused for which they are responsible and be compensated for damage su¤ered for which they are not". Hence, our approach allows one to make recommendations based on the planner's assignment of responsibilities (which is beyond the scope of this work). More precisely, the resulting cost shares will be tailored to re ‡ect this assignment of responsibilities, whether it considers that countries are fully responsible for all historical emissions (what we call the Historical Responsibility view) or whether one deems climate change to be independent of CO 2 emissions (what we call the External Shock view).
Our approach is related to that of Bossert (1995) and Fleurbaey and Bossert (1996) in that we separate country charateristics into two categories: that of "relevant" characteristics for which countries are deemed responsible and which are related to climate change (i.e., possibly past and present emissions), and "irrelevant" characteristics for which countries should not be held responsible or which are unrelated to climate change (i.e., aspects of geographical location like latitude and coastality; and possibly emissions, depending on the point of view). Then, we formulate axioms which any taxation rule must verify to be compatible with the desired view of responsibility adopted by the planner.
Ideally, one would want to hold countries fully responsible for di¤erences in their relevant characteristics while being fully compensated for di¤erences in their irrelevant characteristics. Unfortunately, a strong tension exists between these considerations of responsibility and compensation, making them typically incompatible in their strong versions except for unreasonably simplistic case of a linear damage function. Therefore, when deciding on what sharing rule to implement, the planner faces a trade-o¤ between relaxing the extent to which countries are held responsible for their relevant emissions and the extent to which they can be compensated for di¤erences in irrelevant characteristics. The type of cost-sharing mechanisms that emerge from our analysis consists in holding countries responsible-or compensating them-for di¤erences in characteristics, not among themselves per se, but relative to a reference level. Thus, while still taking di¤erences in characteristics into account, cost allocation becomes mathematically feasible, at the expense of being able to charge strictly according to marginal costs. Hence, the possible solutions we o¤er will di¤er in how strongly they depart from marginal-cost pricing.
More speci…cally, one of the two solutions we propose, the Egalitarian Equivalent mechanism, splits the consequences of deviations from a reference vector of irrelevant characteristics while sharing equally the residual impact of global warming, once each country has paid for its incremental contribution 4 . In other words, the Egalitarian Equivalent mechanism prices emissions at incremental cost while balancing the budget via lump-sum transfers based on countries'irrelevant characteristics. In the responsibility-compensation spectrum, one could argue that the Egalitarian Equivalent mechanism insists on compensation at the expense of responsibility.
Symmetrically, the second solution we propose, the Conditionally Equivalent mechanism guarantees each agent the average payo¤ of a hypothetical situation in which all countries have the characteristics they are responsible for equal to a reference level. Each country bears the consequences of any deviation from this reference level. As such, the Conditionally Equivalent mechanism insists on countries'responsibility at the expense of compensation considerations. Because countries are (marginally) taxed according to marginal damage, it is akin to Pigou taxation, thus implementing the …rst-best level of emissions.
Our compensation-responsibility approach builds upon that developed in Bossert (1995) and Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) after adapting it to a context of externalities. Indeed, their setting focuses on wealth redistribution in the absence of externalities, which would be tantamount to assuming a damage function which is separable in the countries'emissions levels. Such an assumption would be ill-adapted in our context. By contrast, our setup introduces interdependence between the countries'characteristics (emission levels) through the damage function. As a result, the analysis allows for applications in more general settings where externalities are present. Moreover, our results con…rm and extend the appeal of the Egalitarian Equivalent and the Conditionally Equivalent solutions to the more general context of externalities.
The model
Let S = f1; :::; mg N be the set of countries 5 . We denote by n i the population of country i and by n = (n 1 ; :::; n m ) 2 N m the population pro…le. We write In contrast with private bene…ts, which are solely dependent upon a country's own emissions, per capita country environmental damage will depend on total emissions. More precisely, let X = P i=1;:::;m n i x i be the total level of emissions, where
i designates country i's cumulated emissions 10 .
Whenever convenient, we write X i = P j6 =i n j x j Formally, we denote by d i (X) the current per capita damage incurred by country i. We do not make any assumption on the functions d i (X) other than continuity. In particular, it may be the case that some countries actually bene…t from global warming for some values of X. That is to say we do not exclude the possibility that d i (X) < 0 6 From a practical standpoint, current emissions can be interpreted as emissions in the very recent past, say, between 5 and 8 years. This time frame could coincide with the reevaluation periods of the major international protocols (Kyoto, Copenhagen, etc.). 7 To lighten notation, we do not index variables by their time subscript. It will be implicit throughout that all the analysis takes place at time t, and that x c = x c t while x p = P s<t x c s . More generally, any value decribed as "current" will refer to a value at time t.
for some countries: Nonethless, we assume total damage,
problem and denote by P the class of such problems.
Our goal is to design a transfer schedule to correct the arguably uneven distribution of damage due to global warming while providing incentives for countries to reduce their emissions, possibly up to inducing full e¢ ciency. Formally, this amounts to compensating every country for the per capita damage it incurs,
, while setting up vectors of per capita transfer payments, t i (n; b; d; x p ; x c ),
to …nance the total amount compensated: Finally, some still argue that no causal link between human emissions and climate change can be ascertained. According to this fourth viewpoint, which we shall call the External Shock view ( henceforth, ES), countries'emissions levels are irrelevant in redistributing the costs associated with climate change. Note that the ES view is not at odds with the desire to redistribute the impacts of climate change; it simply assumes that damages are not caused by emissions.
11
Prior to further investigating the concepts of responsibility and compensation in a global warming context, we impose two minimal fairness requirement.
Anonymity requires countries with identical characteristics to be treated equally, while Solidarity asks that no country bene…ts from seeing the damage of other countries suddenly increase, all else equal.
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Axiom 1 (Anonymity) For any P = (n; b; d; x p ; x c ) 2 P, and any i; j 2 S,
Axiom 2 (Solidarity) For any P = (n; b; d; x p ; x c ) and
for all i 2 S:
3 Responsibility and compensation 
and t j P = t j (P ) for all j 6 = i: 1 3 We opted for an informal statement for the sake of readability. Formally, the statement should read: "For any i 2 S, and any P ,P 2 P such that (n;b;d) = (n; b; d) and (x 
and t j P = t j (P ) for all j 6 = i
Solidarity and LMR together imply that one should charge countries a perunit cost equal to the average (and marginal) global damage.
Proposition 2 LMR and Solidarity imply Average Damage Pricing:
Proof. See Appendix A.2.1.
Hence, it would seem that the rather weak axiom of LMR points to a strong characterization of average damage pricing. While formally correct, we argue that this result relies heavily on a reference level (zero emissions) which we deem inappropriate in our context: granting such a special role to the unattainable (and undesirable) outcome of zero emissions is ill-suited to handling an e¢ cient, or merely a realistic emissions level. Instead, we allow for the planner to decide on the appropriate reference emissions levelX. In practice, this reference level,X, can be thought of as a target emissions level. In that case, the ratio
approximates the notion of marginal damage around the reference levelX. The corresponding axiom, Full Reference Responsibility asks that countries be held responsible for departures from the reference level on a per capita basis:
Axiom 5 (FRR) Full Reference Responsibility:
+ be a reference vector of per capita emissions and de…ne total reference emissions accordingly: e X = P j=1;:::;m n j x, withx =x p +x c .
For any P = (n; b; d; x p ; x c ) 2 P, and anyP = (n; b; d;
where 1 m stands for the m-unit vector,
Remark 1 Clearly, if the damage function, D, is linear, FMR and FRR coincide.
A complementary interpretation of responsibility is that each country must pay the incremental damage it imposes onto the rest of society:
Holding countries responsible only for their relevant characteristics implies that the transfer t i (P j xi=(0;0) ) should not depend on characteristics for which countries are not deemed responsible:
A weaker version only requires an equal contribution when all countries' irrelevant characteristics are identical to a reference.
Axiom 7 (ECRIC) Equal Contribution for Reference Irrelevant Characteristics.
Consider a reference bene…t function,b, then:
If b i =b for all i 2 S, then:
Remark 2 Clearly, F M R is a more demanding axiom than F RR, and ECEIC 1 4 The shorthand notation P j x i =(0;0) designates a global warming problem identical to P in every way except for country i's emissions, which are zero. Recall that we are adopting the HR view of responsibility. For instance, under the nHR view, the analog would be P j x c i =0 . 1 5 This axiom, and others considered here, result from adapting axioms found in Bossert (1995) and Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) to a context with externalities.
is more demanding than ECRIC. However, no such relationship exists between F RR and ECEIC. 
for all j 6 = i.
Remark 3 Under GSIC, budget balance implies
; and
Another interpretation of compensation consists in requiring that citizens of two countries with identical relevant characteristics should end up with the same payo¤:
Axiom 9 (EPER) Equal Payo¤ for Equal Responsibility.
A considerably weaker version of the above axiom requires …nal payo¤ equality only in when the relevant characteristics of all countries are equal to a given reference level.
Axiom 10 (EPRR) Equal Payo¤ for Reference Responsibility.
Let (x p ;x c ) 2 R 
for all i; j 2 S:
Remark 4 Clearly, EPER is more demanding than EPRR. However, no such relationship between GSIC and the other two axioms. 
Tension between compensation and responsibility
As it turns out, it is generally impossible to compensate countries for di¤erences in irrelevant characteristics while penalizing or rewarding them for di¤erences in relevant characteristics, at least in the strong interpretation of these concepts. Proof. In Appendix A.3.2.
Consequently, the only way to reconcile the concepts of compensation and responsibility is to weaken at least one of the two axioms. We discuss these weakenings in turn and characterize the corresponding mechanisms in the next section.
4 The Egalitarian Equivalent and the Conditionally Equivalent mechanisms
The Egalitarian Equivalent mechanism
The Egalitarian Equivalent mechanism splits the consequences of deviations from a reference vector of irrelevant characteristics while sharing equally the residual impact of global warming, after each country has paid for its incremental contribution:
De…nition 1 Egalitarian Equivalent transfer:
Let P 2 P and consider a reference vector of irrelevant characteristicsb: Then,
The Egalitarian Equivalent mechanism is characterized by the combination of GSIC and ECRIC.
Theorem 1 A transfer schedule, t, satis…es GSIC and ECRIC if and only if
Proof. See the Appendix A.2.2.
Remark 5
The above characterization is tight: the strengthening of ECRIC into ECEIC yields an impossibility. Indeed, the reader can check that the EE solution does not satisfy ECEIC.
The Conditionally Equivalent mechanism
The Conditionally Equivalent mechanism guarantees each agent the average payo¤ of a hypothetical situation in which all countries'relevant characteristics are equal to a reference level. Each country bears the consequences of any deviation from this reference level. Formally, De…nition 2 Conditionally Equivalent (CE) transfer:
Let P 2 P and consider a reference vector of relevant characteristics (x p ;x c ) 2
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For any i 2 S, t HR CE i
The CE mechanism is characterized by FRR and EPRR.
Theorem 2 A transfer schedule, t, satis…es FRR and EPRR if and only if
Proof. See Appendix A.2.3.
Remark 6
The above characterization is tight: the strengthening of EPRR into EPER yields an impossibility. Indeed, the reader can check that the CE solution does not satisfy EPER.
Conclusion
The following table summarizes the relationship between the axioms considered thus far. Table 1 Axioms GSIC EPER EPRR
As in the theory on responsibility and compensation formalized by Bossert (1995) and Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) , the Egalitarian Equivalent and the Conditional Equivalent solutions play a key role. These …ndings con…rm the importance of these solutions, even in settings where externalities are present.
However, unlike in Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) , the (equivalent of) axioms ECEIC and ECRIC are generally incompatible with both EPER and EPRR.
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This is due to the fact that we consider population to be a "neutral" charac-
teristic. Yet, population is a crucially important characteristic of the problem at hand due to the fact that our approach to responsibility is at the per capita level while data on the characteristics considered (emissions and bene…ts in particular) are likely to only be available at the aggregate level. This dichotomy inevitably places special emphasis on the population characteristic. Yet, while we do not deem individuals responsible for the population of the country they belong to (i.e., population is not a relevant characteristic), we do not believe the taxation scheme should compensate or penalize them for it (i.e., population is not an irrelevant characteristic either). These practical considerations illustrate the necessity of formally introducing a third type of characteristics-"neutral" characteristics-in the axiomatic analysis to responsibility and compensation.
To the best of our knowledge, no general theory has been established that considers neutral characteristics. for all i; j 2 S:
Remark 9 For each interpretation of the above three axioms, the most demanding is GSIC while the least demanding is EPRR. For each of the four views, the Egalitarian Equivalent mechanism is characterized by the appropriate combination of GSIC and ECRIC.
Theorem 3 A mechanism, t, satis…es nHR-GSIC and nHR-ECRIC if and only if t = t nHR EE :
A mechanism, t, satis…es GF-GSIC and GF-ECRIC if and only if t = t GF EE :
A mechanism, t, satis…es ES-GSIC and ES-ECRIC if and only if t = t ES EE :
Proof. We prove the result under the HR viewpoint, but the proof technique is similar for the other "views". It is easily checked that t HR EE satis…es the required axioms. Conversely, let P = (n; b; d; x p ; x c ) 2 P, letb be a reference bene…t function and denotẽ P = (n; 
